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JURISDICTION STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Must intent to abandon be considered in determining whether a nonconforming
use has been lost where West Valley City Municipal Code §7-18-106(3) requires, "If the
nonconforming use is discontinued for a continuous period of more than one year it shall
constitute an abandonment of the use and any future use of such land shall conform to the
provisions of the zone in which it is located," and where Utah Code Annotated § 10-9103(1 )(1) defines a nonconforming use of land as a use that "has been maintained
continuously since the time the zoning regulation governing the land changed?"
Standard of review: Review is for correctness. Interpretation of the meaning of
zoning ordinances by a board of adjustment is not entitled to deference. Patterson v.
Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1995); Brown v. Sandy
City Bd. of Adjustment 957 P.2d 207, FN 5 (Utah App. 1998).
Citation to the record: This issue was discussed by the board at its meeting. (R.
59, 60, 79-89).
2. Did Cleone Kirby intend to continue the nonconforming use of allowing horses
on her property where horses belonging to someone else were removed from her property
only because a neighbor removed his fence, where the property was vacant for two years,
and where another person built a fence and placed her horse on the property after those
two years?

1

Standai d ol mi \ i

] fl

'hen a district court's review of an administrative decision

is challenged on appeal'and the district /'iiiif's rrvinv nns limited lr "l'li< ivconl before
the board, the appellate court reviews the administrative decision just as if the appeal had
cc iiic directly from the agency. Caster v. West Valley City, 2001 UT App 212, ^4, 29
P.3d 22,23 (Utah App. 2001). The decision of the hnnid >"i " 1 he *»«.n,1c«I «< <l I
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. I Itah Code Ann. § 10-91

Substantial evidence is that quantum and quaui\ *n relevant evidence that is

adequate to convince a reasonable mind to suppoi t a - •

'

r

Caster, J( M i 1 III App

212,1J4,29 P.3d 22, 23.
. C itiilioii lo (I i" t mil, 1 In . issue was'discussed *H im board ax its meeting. (R,
59, 60, 79-89).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
West V allej Cit> ! i lunicipal Code § ; 18 106(3) •
"Nonconforming Use of Land. A nonconforming use vi I;JM.; jwiuli) existing on the
effective date of this Chapter may be continued provided >,.. nonconforming use shall
not be expanded or extended into any other open land, except as otherwise provided in
this Chapter. If the nonconforming use is discontinued for a continuous period of more
than one year it shall constitute an abandonment of the use and any future use of such
land shall conform to the provisions of the zone in which it is located."
Utah Code Annotated §10-9-103(1)(1)
"'Nonconforming use' means a use of ,
. (i) legally existed before its current
zoning designation; (ii) has been maintained continuously since the time the zoning
regulation governing the land changed; and (iii) because of subsequent zoning changes,
does not conform with the zoning regulations that now govern the land."
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Nature of the case: This is a review of a board of adjustment decision to
allow a nonconforming use.
2. Course of proceedings: On June 21,2004 Alfred Newman, trustee of the
Elvis Kirby Estate, filed a Non-conforming Use Application To The Board Of
Adjustment. (R. 25). The West Valley City Board of Adjustment held a meeting to
consider the application (B-9-2004) on July 7, 2004. (R. 58). The board voted 4 to 1 in
favor of the following motion: "that in the matter of B-9-2004, that we approve the nonconforming use on this property as animals were historically on the property and I believe
the property owners did not intend to abandon that use for the keeping of animals." (R.
88-89). A neighboring landowner, Edward Rogers, filed a Petition for Review with the
Third District Court on August 5,2004. (R. 1). Without any addition to the record from
the Board of Adjustment, the District Court affirmed the board's decision on January 7,
2005. (R. 143). This appeal was filed with the Utah Supreme Court on February 3, 2005.
(R. 145). The Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals.
(R. 147).
3. Statement of facts:
Cleone Kirby owns a life estate (the remainder owners are never mentioned) on a
parcel of land at 3724 South 3200 West in West Valley City ("The Property"). (R. 27).
Livestock, including horses, was maintained on the property beginning in 1958. (R. 60).
Horses were on the property through 2000 and for many months in 2001 or 2002. (R. 62,
65,66). West Valley City incorporated in 1980 and created zoning provisions that
3

prohibit animals like horses in the area that includes Cleone Kirby's property, making the
keeping of horses a nonconforming use. (R. 58).
Cleone Kirby had not maintained a personally owned horse on her property for the
past several years, and there was no evidence that she owned a horse at any relevant time,
though various other people had placed horses on her property. (R. 62,64 - Fred Kirby,
65 -Ronald Richins, 68 -Barbara Spray, 70 -Raymond Spray). For a period of two years
between 2002 and 2004 no horse resided on the Mrs. Kirby's property. (R. 66).
An apartment complex borders the Kirby Property. (R. 60,71-76). When the
apartment complex was built in 1973 or 1974, the builder built a cedar fence along the
border between the complex and the Kirby Property. (R. 62, 72,74). Fred Kirby and his
brothers and/or his father had already built a fence to separate the two properties, but that
fence was removed when the cedar fence was built. (R. 62—Fred Kirby, 85—Mr.
Moore).
In 1977 Edward Rogers purchased the apartment complex, which included the
rights to the fence. (R. 71, 84, 85). In 2000, Fred Kirby and his fiance moved their three
horses from the Property to Bountiful, Utah because they could not maintain the cedar
fence (there was no evidence that anyone or anything prevented Fred Kirby from building
a new fence). (R. 62, 63).
In 2001 or 2002, Ronald Richins's brother placed horses on the Kirby Property,
where they stayed "for months." (R. 65). In 2002 two men named Joe and Lou
approached Cleone Kirby and asked permission to drop some trees on her property to
prevent the trees from falling on the apartments. (R. 77). Cleone Kirby said Joe and Lou
4

said Edward Rogers told them he (Edward Rogers) intended to rebuild the fence they had
to take down to drop the trees. (R. 77, 87). Because the fence was removed, Ronald
Richins's brother removed the horses he had placed on the property many months before
(there was no evidence that anyone or anything prevented Ronald Richins's brother from
building a new fence). (R. 65). "One of the reasons" Ronald Richins's brother could not
return the horses to the Kirby Property is the fence was not replaced. (R. 65).
Barbara and Raymond Spray moved to Utah from Oklahoma in 2003 to be with
Barbara Spray's ailing father. (R. 68,70). In June 2004, one month before the board
meeting, and after a two-year absence of horses, Ronald Richins with financial help from
the Sprays built a chain-link fence to enclose Cieone Kirby's property. (R. 64, 65,68,
70). The Sprays then placed their horse on the Property. (R. 68,70).
Twenty three statements of "I have observed that at least one horse has been on
the property a substantial portion of every year since . . . " were also given to the board.
(R. 28-51). None of the statements is notarized. One appears to be a forgery (R. 48, 51).
One appears to contradict the person's own live testimony to the board of a two-year
absence of horses (R. 34, 65). They all contradict the landowner's admission that no
horses resided on the property for a period of two years between 2002 and 2004. (R. 66).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The West Valley City Municipal Ordinance at issue is unambiguous. A
discontinuance of the nonconforming use for over one year extinguishes that use, and
future use must conform to current zoning provisions. Cieone Kirby discontinued having
horses on her property for a two-year period. Because the ordinance extinguishes
5

nonconforming uses without regard to intent to abandon the use, the West Valley City
Board of Adjustment should have disregarded Cleone Kirby intent and denied her
application to resume maintaining horses on her property. This reasoning is in line with a
growing minority of jurisdictions, it gives full credit to the ordinance as written, and it
promotes the public policy of creating uniform zoning plans and phasing out as quickly
as possible nonconforming uses.
Some jurisdictions that dispense with an intent requirement still allow a
nonconforming use if discontinuance occurred due to circumstances wholly beyond the
control of the landowner. No such circumstances exist in this case. If they did, this
Court should disregard them because the statute does not mention circumstances beyond
the landowner's control and because doing so requires an examination of intent, which is
irrelevant.
Considering the evidence of intent, though, the record lacks substantial evidence
to support a finding of intent to rebut a presumption of intent to abandon. Cleone Kirby
did not attempt to build a fence to hold horses or to obtain a horse within the two-year
period of time. Her neglect, and not the actions of others, is the cause of the
discontinuance of horses on the property.
This Court should accept the objective test of discontinuance for one year and
disregard evidence of intent to abandon or external circumstances. Further, this Court
should reverse the Board's decision to permit the nonconforming use and require the
Board to retract its approval of the nonconforming use application in this matter.

6

ARGUMENT
The current zoning provisions for Cleone Kirby's property prohibit maintaining
animals such as horses. Because horses were maintained on the Property at the time
West Valley City incorporated, the maintaining of horses was a legal nonconforming use
of the land pursuant to West Valley City Municipal Code §7-18-106(3) ("The
Ordinance"). That same ordinance that allows the nonconforming use prohibits it if the
use "is discontinued for a continuous period of more than one year." Id
No horses resided on the Property for two years. (R. 66). Consequently the
nonconforming use was lost, regardless of the landowner's intent to abandon the use.
Even if intent to abandon is a necessary inquiry the record lacks substantial evidence of
Cleone Kirby's intent to continue the nonconforming use. This Court must reverse the
West Valley City Board of Adjustment decision to approve the nonconforming use of
allowing horses on Cleone Kirby's property.
A.

Cleone Kirby's intent is irrelevant
West Valley City Municipal Code §7-18-106(3) reads,
"Nonconforming Use of Land.1 A nonconforming use of land lawfully
existing on the effective date of this Chapter may be continued provided
such nonconforming use shall not be expanded or extended into any other
open land, except as otherwise provided in this Chapter. If the
nonconforming use is discontinued for a continuous period of more than
one year it shall constitute an abandonment of the use and any future use of

1

Utah Code Annotated §10-9-103(1)0) defines a nonconforming use of land as a use that
"(i) legally existed before its current zoning designation; (ii) has been maintained
continuously since the time the zoning regulation governing the land changed; and (iii)
because of subsequent zoning changes, does not conform with the zoning regulations that
now govern the land."
7

such land shall conform to the provisions of the zone in which it is
located."
The ordinance unmistakably uses the word "shall" to describe what must occur if
a nonconforming use is discontinued for more than one year. It also uses "shall" to
describe the relationship between a discontinuance and abandonment, leaving no doubt as
to the ordinance's meaning. The discontinuance of the nonconforming use "shali
constitute an abandonment of the use" and future use "shall conform to the provisions of
the zone in which it is located."
It is undisputed no horses resided on Cleone Kirby's property for a continuous
two-year period between 2002 and 2004. (R. 66). Based solely on that fact, the use has
been abandoned, and any future use must conform to the current zoning provisions. The
ordinance does not require an inquiry into the landowner's intent to abandon. On the
contrary, by its strict language the ordinance forbids an inquiry into intent if the
nonconforming use is discontinued for more than a year. The discontinuance "shall
constitute and abandonment."
As West Valley City argued to this Court just a few years ago in Caster v. West
Vallev City. 2001 UT App 212, 29 P.3d 22 (Utah App. 2001), Utah case law
demonstrates the validity of the West Valley City discontinuance provision.2 As West
Valley City explained, "The law in Utah is clear. State statute, Morrison, and Holt

2

In Caster, the Court did not reach the question of intent as it relates to abandonment of a
nonconforming use. Caster. 2001 UT App 212, 29 P.3d 22 at footnote 2. However, both
parties argued the issue in their Briefs. (See Addendum). The only reason the West
Valley City Board of Adjustment considered intent in the current case is because it
thought this Court in Caster had required an inquiry into intent. (R. 59, 60,79)
8

demonstrate that discontinuance ordinances are common and valid in Utah and where
evidence exists confirming discontinuance for the required time period, property owners
are required to comply with current zoning standards."3 (Addendum p. 3).
The City continued, "Utah state statute requires continuous use of a
nonconforming use to maintain nonconforming use status. By defining a nonconforming
use as a use of land that 'has been maintained continuously since the time the zoning
regulation governing the land changed,' it is clear that a nonconforming use that has not
been continuously maintained must comply with current zoning regulation. Utah Code
Ann. §10-9-103(l)(l)(ii)(2000)." (Addendum p. 3).
In State of Utah v. Estate of Holt, the Supreme Court of Utah held, "evidence
which showed a discontinuance of the non-conforming use for a period of five years after
the one-year period provided in the ordinance proved an effective abandonment of such
right and the property was thereafter subject to the zoning requirements." 381 P.2d 724,
725 (Utah 1963).
Other jurisdictions agree the running of a statutory discontinuance period results in
the loss of nonconforming use status. A Minnesota court explained,
"Minn.Stat. §394.36 and section 16 of the Isanti County Zoning Ordinance
clearly state that discontinuation of a non-conforming us for one year
results in termination of that use. This court cannot amend these
unambiguous provisions by placing upon counties the burden of having to
prove that a landowner intended to abandon a discontinued nonconforming
use.

3

Morrison v. Home. 363 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1961); State of Utah v. Estate of Holt 381
p.2d 724 (1963)
9

County of Isanti v. Peterson, 469 N.W.2d 467,470 (Minn. App. 1991); See also,
Auditorium. Inc. v. Board of Adjustment of Mavor. Etc.. 91 A.2d 528 (Del. 1952),
(holding discontinuance shall be deemed abandoned where the ordinance so states, and
"the attempt of the Board of Adjustment to reserve the right to resume the prior nonconforming use . . . was contrary to the express provision of the Building Zone Ordinance
and, therefore, of no effect.").

The West Valley City ordinance is equally clear about

the effect of discontinuance for more than one year and must be enforced as written.
The Supreme Court of Colorado reasoned that requiring intent to abandon where
the ordinance eliminates a nonconforming use upon discontinuance for a certain period of
time produces "unfortunate but silly" results. Hartley v. City of Colorado Springs. 764
R2d 1216, 1223 (Colo. 1988), quoting 4A N. Williams & J. Taylor, American Land
Planning Law §115.06, at 193 (rev. ed. 1986). It "encourages property owners who have
actually abandoned their nonconforming use to commit perjury" and "not only disregards
but supersedes the intention of the legislative body that designed the ordinance." Id
Moreover, it imposes a difficult evidentiary burden on those seeking to prove that a
property owner has discontinued a nonconforming use and impedes the desirable goal of
creating uniform zoning plans. Hartley. 764 P.2d at 1225.
The reason for ignoring the intent of the landowner when considering
nonconforming uses is sound. "Public policy encourages the elimination of
nonconforming uses primarily because they detract from the effectiveness of
comprehensive land use regulation, often resulting in lower property values and blight."
Citv of Glendale v. Aldabbagh. 939 P.2d 418,421 (Ariz. 1997) (citations omitted).
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"Consequently, nonconforming uses are excepted from the general rule that zoning
ordinances should be strictly construed in favor of the property owner." Id.; See also,
Hartley. 764 P.2d at 1224.
The federal court agrees. The 10th Circuit addressed this issue in C.F. Lytle v.
Clark, holding that a Pitkin County zoning regulation requiring conformity with current
zoning regulations if a nonconforming use is discontinued for a period of one year did not
require a showing of intent to abandon. 491 F. 2d 834, 837 (1974).
The view that intent to abandon is irrelevant to a discontinuance ordinance is the
growing minority view (See, Hartley and Aldabbagh, supra), though the criticized view
that an intent inquiry is necessary in nonconforming use cases, and discontinuance
provides only a rebuttable presumption of abandonment remains the shrinking majority
view. Ansley House. Inc. v. City of Atlanta. 397 S.E.2d 419 (Ga. 1990).
In Ansley House, the court borrowed heavily from "Rathkopf 's The Law of
Zoning and Planning," which explains at common law, the landowner must "abandon" a
use before it is lost, which required (1) proof of intent to abandon and (2) an overt act of
abandoning. IcL, (citing, A. Rathkopf and D. Rathkopf, Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning
and Planning, vol. 4, §51.08, at 130 (1990)). The court reasoned that where an ordinance
"sets forth a specific time period but contains nothing that negates the factor of intent to
abandon," the expiration of the time period raises a rebuttable presumption of intent to
abandon. Ansley House. Inc.. 397 S.E.2d at 421. The controlling ordinance in Ansley
House reads,
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"When a nonconforming use of a major structure or a major structure and
premises in combination is discontinued for a continuous period of one (1)
year, the structure and premises in combination, shall not thereafter be used
except in conformity with the regulations of the district in which it is
located. Such restriction shall not apply if such cessation is as a direct
result of governmental action impeding access to the premises."
I&,397S.E.2dat419.
Significantly, the West Valley City ordinance goes much further than the Ansley
House ordinance and those like it. Whereas the Ansley House ordinance mentions a
period of discontinuance and the allowable use thereafter, the West Valley City ordinance
adds that disuse for the time period "shall constitute abandonment," effectively removing
any relevance of intent to abandon.
The West Valley City ordinance is clear. Intent to abandon is irrelevant to the
issue of whether a nonconforming use is lost. The Board erred in analyzing Cleone
Kirby's intent and basing its permission to resume the nonconforming use on her intent.
B.

Loss of the nonconforming use was not due to circumstances beyond Cleone
Kirby's control.
Some courts that have adopted the objective test, consistent with a discontinuance

ordinance, have nevertheless added a caveat that discontinuance "must be attributable at
least in part to the property owner." City of Glendale v. Aldabbagh. 939 P.2d 418,420
(Ariz. 1997). However, "termination of a nonconforming use does not require a decision
by the property owner to discontinue the use. A nonconforming use may be lost through
negligence or inadvertence." Id, 939 P.2d at 421.
The phrase, "circumstances beyond the property owner's control" is generally
used to describe the situation where the property owner has no control at all over the
12

discontinuance of the nonconforming use. Smith v. Bd of Adjustment of City of Cedar
Rapids. 460 N.W.2d 854 (Iowa 1990). Some of the circumstances courts have
determined are completely beyond the control of the property owner are war and the
consequent restriction imposed upon use by governmental authority, a general shortage of
supplies necessary for the continued operation of the nonconforming use, a drop in
demand, unlawful court order to discontinue, destruction by fire, flood, hurricane,
inability to find a tenant. Ernst v. Johnson County. 522 N.W.2d 599 (Iowa 1994);
Marchese v. Norristown Borough Zoning Bd. of Adjustment. 277 A.2d 176 (Pa. Cmwlth
1971).
The circumstances described by the courts prevented continuance of the
nonconforming use despite efforts by the landowner to continue the use. The record in
this case does not reflect any such circumstances. Three circumstances discussed by the
board are worth reviewing. First, Cleone Kirby lives on limited Social Security income.
Second, Edward Rogers removed his cedar fence. Third, Fred Kirby and Ronald
Richins's brother removed their horses.
A limited income is not a circumstance considered beyond a landowner's control,
such as a decrease in demand would be. Ernst v. Johnson County. 522 N.W. 2d 599
(Iowa 1994). Cleone Kirby alone, and not customers, suppliers, or anyone else caused
her to be on Social Security. Additionally, the maintenance of a horse did not depend
wholly on Cleone Kirby's income. At the time of the hearing, a horse resided on the
Property, even though Mrs. Kirby was on Social Security. Accepting financial status as a
circumstance beyond the control of the landowner would reopen the question of intent to
13

continue the use, which is precisely what the discontinuance statute attempts to avoid, as
discussed above.
Edward Rogers's removal of his fence is a circumstance beyond Cleone Kirby's
control, as is Fred Kirby's and Ronald Richins's brother's removal of their horses from
the property. Nevertheless, these circumstances alone did not prevent Cleone Kirby from
building a fence and placing horse on the property. Nobody physically prevented her
from doing so. The government did not issue an order preventing the use. Nowhere in
the record did anyone claim Mrs. Kirby was prevented from using her land as she wished.
Cleone Kirby alone, as the landowner, had the responsibility to preserve the
nonconforming use, as explained in Smith v. Bd. of Adjustment of City of Cedar Rapids.
460 N.W.2d 854.
In Smith, a landowner could not find a new lessee or buyer for his commercial
structure, a nonconforming building in a residential zone. Id., 460 N.W.2d at 855. Ten
months into the 12-month discontinuance period the zoning administrator sent Mr. Smith
a letter revoking the nonconforming use. Id The court recognizes the rule that
nonconforming uses are not discontinued when the discontinuance is entirely beyond
their control. Id, 460 N.W.2d at 857. When Mr. Smith complained he was prevented
from using the property too early, the court held it was Mr. Smith who was "obliged to
act with some dispatch" in challenging the zoning administrator. Id, 460 N. W.2d at 858.
"Instead he did nothing for nearly 14 months." IdL
Likewise, Cleone Kirby should have acted with some dispatch when Edward
Rogers removed his cedar fence and when Ronald Richins's brother removed his horses.
14

Instead she waited two years. As stated above, the loss of a nonconforming use "does not
require a decision by the property owner to discontinue the use. A nonconforming use
may be lost through negligence or inadvertence." City of Glendale v. Aldabbagh. 939
P.2d at 421. Regardless whether Cleone Kirby intended to discontinue the
nonconforming use, she lost the use when through negligence or inadvertence she did not
have a horse on her property for two years.
C.

Circumstances beyond a landowners control should be irrelevant absent a
directive in the ordinance to consider such circumstances.
Instead of attempting to analyze what is or is not beyond a landowner's control,

many objective-test jurisdictions ignore the question unless the ordinance specifically
makes such an exception like the ordinance at issue in Jones v. Cusimano. 524 So.2d 172
(La.App.4Cir. 1988). That ordinance made an exception to discontinuance in instances
where certain legal impediments prevented "possession, occupation, or control of the
property." WL, 524 So.2d at 173, 174. No reservation exists in the West Valley City
ordinance (though even if it did, nothing prevented Cleone Kirby from possessing,
occupying, or controlling her property).
A Maryland court held a nonconforming use of operating a restaurant in a
residential zone was lost when the discontinuance period ran, despite the facts that the
owner diligently attempted to find a tenant to continue the operation, the restaurant
remained as it was, ready to operate, and the operator had not demonstrated an intent to
use the land for anything but a restaurant. Canada's Tavern. Inc. v. Town of Glen Echo.
271 A2d 664,665 (Md. App. 1970).

15

In Hartley, the court held the nonconforming use of maintaining a wood and coal
business was lost when lessees of the property discontinued the use, even though lessees
had contracted with the owners to continue the wood and coal business. Hartley v. City
of Colorado Springs. 764 P.2d 1216 (Colo. 1988). Similarly in this case, Cleone Kirby
argued she discontinued the use of maintaining horses only because of the undesired acts
of others.
The landowners in Hartley are not without recourse, however. They would still
have an action against the lessees for any wrongful loss the lessees caused. Cleone Kirby
would also have a cause of action against a person who wrongfully caused her to lose the
nonconforming use.
The court in Badger v. Town of Ferrisburgh summed up the matter as follows:
"Finally, we address property owner's policy argument that they should not
lose nonconforming-use status based on involuntary inactivity beyond their
control. As we stated above, the Legislature has adopted the policy of
phasing out nonconforming uses, and the ordinance provision is consistent
with that policy. To implement the phase-out policy, the Legislature and the
Town can decide to establish a bright line that applies irrespective of the
intent of the owner's ability to use the property."
712 A.2d 911, 915 (Vt. 1988). To demonstrate that a bright line test can have positive
effects, the court added, "In general, a bright line aids subsequent purchasers . . . because
they can easily ascertain whether they can use the property as a nonconforming use." id.
This Court should adopt a rule consistent with the language of the ordinance and
obvious intent of West Valley City to phase out nonconforming uses. If a nonconforming
use is discontinued for more than twelve months, it has been abandoned, and any future
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use must conform to current zoning provisions, regardless of intent to abandon and
regardless of circumstances that may be beyond the landowner's control.
D.

The record lacks substantial evidence of Cleone Kirbv's intent to continue the
nonconforming use.
Should this Court decide to consider Cleone Kirby's intent to abandon, the record

does not contain substantial evidence to rebut the presumption that Cleone Kirby
intended to abandon the nonconforming use. The following items make up all the
evidence the Board used or could have used to support such a finding of intent.
1) Previous horses on the property were removed only because Edward Rogers
removed his fence or because the owners of the horse could not maintain Mr. Rogers's
fence. (R. 60).
2) The lack of a fence bordering Edward Rogers's property (the apartment
complex) was "one of the reasons why [the horse owners] couldn't put the horses back"
on the property. (R. 65).
3) No improvements were made to the land during the two-year absence of
horses. (R. 83 —Mr. Spendlove).
4) Cleone Kirby visited somebody named Mr. Hooper during the two-year period
to ask him whether Edward Rogers could be forced to replace his fence. (R. 78).
5) After two years without a horse on Mrs. Kirby's property, the Sprays moved to
West Valley City from Oklahoma and, with the help of Ronald Richins, built a fence to
separate the apartment property from Cleone Kirby's property, and placed their horse on
Mrs. Kirby's property.
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6) Cleone Kirby likes the horse that is currently on her property and would like
the horse to stay. (R. 60).
The policy behind zoning laws "is the gradual elimination of non-conforming uses
and, accordingly, ordinances should not be given an interpretation which would permit an
indefinite continuation of the non-conforming use." State Ex Rel. Peterson v. Burt. 166
N.W.2d 207, 210 (Wis. 1969), citing, McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 3rd Edition,
Vol 8, section 25.189 (see current volume 8A, (2005)). To interpret the West Valley City
ordinance to permit a nonconforming use wherever a landowner resumes the use (item 5
above) or expresses a desire to do so (item 6 above) would permit an indefinite
continuation of all nonconforming uses. For such evidence to prove intent, if indeed
intent is relevant would defeat render the discontinuance portion of the ordinance
meaningless.
Likewise, availability of land to be used in the nonconforming way (item 3 above)
cannot support a finding of intent to continue the use. In an Alaska case, owners of an
airstrip failed to personally use their property as an airstrip, though it remained useable as
an airstrip as demonstrated by two trespassers who occasionally used the property as an
airstrip. Cizek v. Concerned Citizens of Eagle River Valley. Inc.. 49 P.3d 228 (Alaska
2002). The Alaska Supreme Court ruled actual use was necessary to maintain a
nonconforming use. IdL Otherwise, "local governments could almost never terminate a
nonconformity because it would legally continue as long as the land's physical suitability
for actual nonconforming use remained." Id, 49 P.3d at 231.
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Cleone Kirby's discussion with Mr. Hooper (item 4 above) is the weakest of all
the possible evidence of intent. The discussion could demonstrate some intent to have a
fence restored, but does not directly confirm an intention to have horses (especially
considering Cleone Kirby does not own a horse). Neither does it demonstrate an "overt
act" toward continuing the use since nothing was done beyond the discussion. Some
examples of overt acts that demonstrate intent include obtaining a building permit,
beginning renovations, applying for a business license, and obtaining a temporary
certificate of occupancy. Ansley House. Inc.. supra. Furthermore, no evidence was
given concerning the timing of the discussion and whether it occurred during the first 12
months of discontinuance or after, which is important (as discussed above).
Finally, that Edward Rogers removed his fence and Ronald Richins's brother
removed his horses have no bearing on Cleone Kirby's intention to maintain horses on
her property. At best it could show Ronald Richins's brother's4 intent to maintain horses
on the Kirby Property.
No evidence was given that Cleone Kirby owns a horse or owned a horse during
the relevant past five years. Though nothing requires the landowner to maintain the
nonconforming use, the landowner's intent, and not the horse owner's intent, is the
critical intent to be proven (again, if intent is even relevant). To suggest otherwise would
be nonsensical. For example, in Cizek, two pilots demonstrated their intent to use the

4

Ronald Richins's brother did not speak at the meeting or send a statement to the board.
All information about him and his horses came from Ronald Richins.
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Cizeks' land as an airstrip by landing planes on it. Cizek. 49 P.3d 228. The court did not
even consider the intent of the other pilots in its analysis. Id
Because Mrs. Kirby did not own a horse, one cannot make the assumption she
intended to have a horse on her property. What one can assume by the evidence is she
allowed people to place their horses on her property. By Mrs. Kirby's own admission she
was not being paid to allow the horses on the property, since she was living on social
security alone. (R. 78). Therefore she could not show an intent to board horses.
All the evidence, when considered together, shows Cleone Kirby allowed horses
on her property and even enjoyed the horses. But no evidence shows she had a plan to
continue having horses on her property or that she did anything to keep the horses on her
property. When the cedar fence was taken down neither she nor anyone else built a new
fence until two years later, after the Sprays unexpectedly moved from Oklahoma with a
horse. When the city condemned the horse shelter (before the fence was removed), she
took it down and did not rebuild. (R. 67).
Although intent of the horse owners is irrelevant, the evidence shows a lack of
intent by Fred Kirby and Ronald Richins's brother to maintain horses on Cleone Kirby's
property. Fred Kirby testified he removed his horses in 2000, while the cedar fence was
still standing, because he could not maintain the cedar fence. (R. 62). The removal of
the fence in 2002 could not possibly relate to his intention to maintain horses there.
No evidence was given of improvements to the cedar fence between the time Fred
Kirby removed his horses and Ronald Richins's brother moved his horses onto the
Property, which means the fence was still in a state of disrepair and unable to contain
20

horses. As the board members noted, owners of animals bear the responsibility to care
for the animals and had the responsibility to build a fence. (R. 84, 85, 87). That Ronald
Richins's brother removed his horses when the cedar fence was removed, rather than
build a new fence, demonstrates his intent not to care for and maintain the animals on the
Kirby Property.
Of course, as explained above, this entire inquiry into intent to abandon or intent
not to abandon is precisely what the nonconforming use ordinance meant to eliminate.
Even considering intent, though, Cleone Kirby did not present evidence to rebut a
presumption of intent to abandon. The nonconforming use of maintaining horses was
lost, and future use must conform to current zoning standards.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, because Cleone Kirby discontinued the nonconforming use for two
years, the nonconforming use was lost, regardless of her intent to continue the use,
actions by others, or her financial status. Nonetheless the record lacks substantial
evidence of intent to continue the nonconforming use or circumstances wholly beyond
Cleone Kirby's control. This Court should reverse the Board's decision and trial court's
order, and require the West Valley City Board of Adjustment to issue a denial of the
application for nonconforming use status.
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i

record demonstrates that they did not.

If a property owner

exercising a nonconforming use cannot lose that status by
failing to obtain a business license, neither should they be
able to maintain their nonconforming use status by obtaining
a business

license when all business activity has been

discontinued.
III. DISCONTINUANCE IS THE APPROPRIATE
METHOD
FOR DETERMINING
LOSS OF
NONCONFORMING USE STATUS
Utah

state

statute

requires

continuous

use

of

nonconforming use to maintain nonconforming use status.

a
By

defining a nonconforming use as a use of land that "has been
maintained continuously since the time the zoning regulation
governing the land changed," it is clear that a nonconforming
use that has not been continuously maintained must comply with
current zoning regulations.

UTAH CODE ANN.

(2000).

to continuously

Caster's

failure

§ 10-9-103(1)(ii)
maintain

the

nonconforming use, or in other words, the discontinuance of
the nonconforming use for a continuous period resulted in a
loss of nonconforming use status.
In addition to the State statute discussed above, Utah
case

law

demonstrates

the

validity

16

of

discontinuance

provisions. Discontinuance ordinances have been validated by
the Supreme Court of Utah in two cases.
In, State of Utah v. Estate of Holt, the Supreme Court of
Utah found that:
"the burden of proving the right of a
non-conforming use of property under an
ordinance . . . was on the property owner
and evidence which showed a discontinuance
of the non-conforming use for a period of
five years after the one-year period
provided in the ordinance proved an effective
abandonment of such right and the property was
thereafter subject to the zoning requirement."
381 P.2d 724, 725 (Utah 1963).
The ordinance in Holt and the West Valley City Ordinance
both requiring compliance with current zoning requirements if
a nonconforming use is discontinued for a continuous period of
one year. Id[; West Valley City Municipal Code § 7-18-106(3).
In accordance with the Holt decision, it follows that evidence
which demonstrates a discontinuance of a nonconforming use for
the stated period results in a loss of nonconforming use
status.

The Board in this case found such evidence of

discontinuance and, therefore, found that Back Yard Auto's
nonconforming use status had lapsed.
In an earlier case, the Supreme Court of Utah found that
a protracted period of unexplained vacancy and no showing of
17

a

nonconforming

use

for

continuous

years

demonstrates

discontinuance. The Court, interpreting the Salt Lake County
Ordinance

in

requirements.
1961).

question, required

conformance

with

zoning

Morrison v. Home, 363 P.2d 1113, 1114 (Utah

Again, the Salt Lake County Ordinance involved in

Morrison

is

nearly

identical

to

the

Id

at

FN1.

discontinuance

ordinance.

discontinuance

provisions

by

the

West

Valley

City

Recognition

Supreme

Court

of

of Utah

demonstrates the policy that nonconforming uses are inapposite
to local government zoning•
zoning

measures

are

to

"Public policy and the spirit of
restrict

and

not

to

increase

nonconforming uses." 8A Julie Rozwadowski and James Solheim,
The Law of Municipal Corporations,(1994).
The law in Utah is clear.

State statute, Morrison, and

JHoTt_demonstrate that discontinuance ordinances are common and
valid

in

Utah

and

where

evidence

exists

confirming

discontinuance for the required time period, property owners
are required to comply with current zoning standards.
In Utah and other states, courts have held that the
running of a discontinuance period results in the loss of
nonconforming use status.

State of Utah v. Estate of Holt,

381 p.2d 724 (1963)/ Morrison v» Home, 363 p.2d 1113 (1961);
18

(f)

Hartley v. City of Colorado Springs. 764 P.2d 1216, 1219
(1988)
required

(holding that proof of intent to abandon is not
when

a

zoning

ordinance

specifies

a

time

for

termination based on discontinuance); Citv of Glendale v.
Aldabbaah. 939 P.2d 418 (1997) (holding that where nonuse is
attributable

to

property

owner,

(not

involuntary),

nonconforming use status could be lost without a showing of
intent); Tovs "R" US v. Silva, 676 N.E.2d 862 (1996);

see

also 8a Julie Rozwadowski, James Solheim, The Law of Municipal
Corporations,§ 23.194, 1994; 4A Norman Williams Jr., John M.
Taylor, American Land Planning Law § 115.14

(1986).

In

addition, the 10th Circuit addressed this issue in C.F. Lvtle
v. Clark, holding that a Pitkin County zoning regulation
requiring conformity with current zoning regulations if a
nonconforming use is discontinued for a period of one year did
not require a showing of intent to abandon.

491 F. 2d 834,

837 (1974).
However, loss of nonconforming use status is determined
differently in other states.

Essentially there are three

distinct rules regarding loss of nonconforming use status. In
some states, a nonconforming use can only be lost through a
showing of intent to abandon and an overt act demonstrating
19

that intent, 8A Eugene McQuillan,Julie Rozwadowski, and James
Solheim, The Law of Municipal Corporations,S 25.192, (1994);
4A Norman Williams Jr., John M. Taylor, American Land Planning
Law § 115.07 (1986); Michael E. Labonati, and John Martinez,
Local Government Law, § 16.16 (2000). This rule, which Caster
now urges this Court to adopt, has been criticized by courts
and commentators.
[T]he rule produces results that are not only
^unfortunate but silly' because it encourages
property owners who have actually
abandoned their nonconforming use to commit
perjury, and because it not only
disregards but supersedes the intention
of the legislative body that designed the
ordinance.
Hartley v. Citv of Colorado Springs, 764 P.2d 1216 (1988)
citing 4A Norman Williams Jr., John M. Taylor, American Land
Planning Law § 115.06 (1986).
In other states, discontinuance creates a rebuttable
presumption of abandonment of nonconforming uses.

In these

states, the municipality has adopted an ordinance with an
automatic termination period based on discontinuance but the
court adds an intent requirement. Ansley House Inc. v. City
of Atlanta, 397 SE2d 419 (1990); County of Isanti v. Peterson,
4 69 NW2d 4 67 (1991) see also 8a Julie Rozwadowski and James
Solheim, The Law of Municipal Corporations,§ 25.194, 1994.
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Although,

numerically,

the

intent

to

abandon

test

represents the majority test, this test and the case law that
discusses was based on the needs of a nation facing the great
depression.

See 4A Norman Williams Jr., John M. Taylor,

American Land Planning Law § 115.06 (1986).

An increasing

number of states are shifting from the common law subjective
test and moving to an objective discontinuance test like the
test that currently exists in Utah.
shift

makes

sense

when

Id. at § 115.14.

considering

the

fact

that

This
the

underlying theory of nonconforming uses is that compliance
with the current zoning is imminent. The objective Utah test
is also a better test because it facilitates the public policy
requiring that nonconforming uses comply with current zoning
ordinances as soon as is fair and appropriate.

Ici. at §

112.07. To change the current nonconforming use law would run
afoul of the trends, it would run against public policy and it
would perpetuate the existence of nonconforming

uses in

derogation of municipal zoning.
CONCLUSION
City ordinance, in accordance with state law requires
conformance with current zoning when a nonconforming use is
discontinued.

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 10-9-103(1);
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